Character (Alone) Doesn't Count: Phenomenal Character and Narrow Intentional Content by Werner, Preston J.
American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 52, Number 3, July 2015
©2015 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
in recent years, a growing research program 
in the metaphysics of intentionality and 
content has centered around the purported 
existence of Phenomenal Intentionality. this 
literature exploded shortly after the publica-
tion of terry horgan and John tienson’s 
(2002) “the intentionality of Phenomenolo-
gy and the Phenomenology of intentionality.” 
Proponents of phenomenal intentionality are 
a diverse bunch that all share some core com-
mitment to a set of theses (albeit to varying 
degrees of strength). in what follows, i will 
be arguing against one of these core theses, 
which i will call (Pi). Briefly, i will argue that 
a mental state M’s having a particular phe-
nomenal character does not alone determine 
the narrow intentional content of M. i will 
begin with a concise discussion of the thesis 
i will be arguing against via its relation to 
the so- called Phenomenal Intentionality Re-
search Program (PiRP).1 then i will present 
my argument against (Pi). Finally, i will draw 
some conclusions about the PiRP and the 
phenomenology of thought more generally.
i. PhenoMenal Constitution and the 
Phenomenology of intentionality
 the most central claim of the PiRP is what 
i will call Phenomenal Constitution:
Phenomenal Constitution (Pc): there is a kind 
of intentionality, pervasive in paradigmatically 
intentional states, that is fully constituted by 
phenomenal character.2
Phenomenal constitution says that for at 
least some important categories of intentional 
states, their narrow content is constitutively 
determined by their phenomenology. Briefly, 
narrow content is content that doesn’t de-
pend on anything external to the individual. 
how far (Pc) extends is a matter of dispute 
between different proponents of the PiRP. 
however, it is standard to take at least beliefs 
and desires as two kinds of intentional states 
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Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmati-
cally intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content. 
if this is correct, then any two states with the same phenomenal character will have the same nar-
row intentional content. using a twin- earth style case, i argue that two different people can be in 
intrinsically identical phenomenological states without sharing narrow intentional contents. After 
describing and defending the case, i conclude by considering a few objections that help to further 
illustrate the problem.
APQ 52_3 text.indd   261 5/20/15   2:57 PM
262  / AMeRicAn PhiLosoPhicAL QuARteRLy
whose narrow content is fully constituted by 
their phenomenal character. My argument 
will involve belief states and their associ-
ated phenomenology, but i think analogous 
arguments could be given for many other 
intentional states as well.
 the thesis i will be arguing against is:
(Pi) necessarily, for any paradigmatically inten-
tional state s with narrow content i, s has some 
phenomenal character q such that any paradig-
matically intentional state with phenomenal 
character q also has i.3
Any kind of intentional state whose con-
tent is fully constituted by its phenomenal 
character will fall under the scope of (Pi). 
Phenomenal constitution says that, with re-
spect to paradigmatically intentional states, 
phenomenal character fully constitutes 
intentional content. this entails that any 
two paradigmatically intentional states with 
identical phenomenal character should have 
the same intentional content. Because (Pc) 
entails (Pi), if (Pi) is false, then (Pc) must be 
as well. i should be explicit that (Pc) and (Pi) 
are intended to be claims only about narrow 
intentional content.
ii. Does Phenomenal character 
Alone Determine narrow 
intentional content? Against (Pi)
 it would be difficult to find direct empiri-
cal data that would provide evidence against 
(Pi). it may be relatively straightforward to 
infer differences in phenomenal character 
between two subjects in the same occurrent 
intentional state based on their reports about 
that very phenomenal character.4 however, in 
order to show (Pi) to be mistaken, we would 
need a case in which we have type- identical 
phenomenal character with distinct inten-
tional content. this does not seem empirically 
discoverable—at least, not given current neu-
roscience. As a result, my argument against 
(Pi) must delve into the realm of metaphysical 
possibility.5 Begin by considering our good 
friend oscar. oscar is sitting in his armchair 
thinking about the flag of nepal. in particular, 
he is thinking about the background color of 
the flag of nepal. oscar has the occurrent 
belief that the background color of the flag 
of Nepal is red. this occurrent belief has a 
particular phenomenology. the phenomenal 
character of oscar’s belief is his visual im-
agery of the flag of nepal, with particular 
attention to the background color of the visual 
imagery. Along with this, oscar has the audi-
tory imagery of his inner voice saying: “the 
background color of the flag of nepal is red.” 
there is also some phenomenal character to 
his assenting to the content that his occurrent 
thought is true—this phenomenology is asso-
ciated with his believing that the background 
color of the flag of nepal is red, rather than 
desiring it, wondering it, and so forth.now 
consider oscar’s next occurrent belief, that 
the background color of the flag of Nepal is 
crimson. the phenomenal character of os-
car’s belief that the background color of the 
flag of Nepal is crimson is extremely similar 
to the phenomenal character of oscar’s be-
lief that the background color of the flag of 
Nepal is red. oscar again has visual imagery 
of the flag of nepal as he remembers it, with 
particular attention to the background color 
of the image in his “mind’s eye.” this will 
presumably be the same visual imagery, since 
crimson is a determinate of the determinable 
red. oscar, we can suppose, while in this 
occurrent belief state has auditory imagery 
of his inner voice saying: “the background 
color of the flag of nepal is crimson.” he 
also has the phenomenology characteristic of 
belief, as opposed to desire, hope, and so on. 
it appears that the only intrinsic difference in 
phenomenal character between the two dif-
ferent occurrent beliefs that oscar could have 
is in the words he says to himself in his inner 
voice. his visual imagery is the same—of the 
flag of nepal as best as he can remember it. 
And his attentive focus on his visual imagery 
is the same—he is focused particularly on the 
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background color of his visual imagery. the 
phenomenology characteristic of belief (as 
opposed to desire, hope, etc.) is the same as 
well.
 none of what’s been said so far is a problem 
for (Pi). the phenomenal character of two 
different intentional states can be similar 
without casting doubt on (Pi). Furthermore, 
we might even expect the phenomenal char-
acter of oscar’s two occurrent belief states to 
be extremely similar, given that the content 
of two belief states is so similar. so oscar’s 
two occurrent belief states either support (Pi) 
or are neutral with respect to it.
 But now consider twin- oscar. twin- oscar 
is oscar’s twin- earth counterpart. twin- 
oscar has all of the same (non- occurrent, de 
dicto) beliefs, desires, hopes, imaginings, and 
so forth as oscar. As is to be expected, twin- 
english contains a miniscule but relevant 
alteration from the english that oscar speaks. 
in twin- english, the word that is phonetically 
and lexically identical to the english word 
“crimson” means red, and the word that is 
phonetically and lexically identical to the 
english word “red” means crimson.
 twin- oscar, like oscar, has the occurrent 
belief that has the content, as we would 
represent it in english, that the background 
color of the flag of Nepal is red. What will 
the phenomenal character of twin- oscar’s 
belief that the background color of the flag of 
Nepal is red be? since twin- oscar is much 
like oscar, the phenomenal character of this 
occurrent belief will be much like oscar’s: 
he will have the visual imagery of the flag of 
nepal, as best as he can remember it (which, 
ex hypothesi, will be the same imagery as 
possessed by oscar), with a particular atten-
tive focus on the background color of the flag. 
the phenomenology of his believing (rather 
than desiring, hoping, etc.) is also the same 
as oscar’s. so far, so good—twin- oscar’s 
belief that the background color of the flag of 
Nepal is red has the same phenomenal visual 
imagery, phenomenal character of attentive 
focus (on the color of the flag), and phe-
nomenology of belief, as oscar’s occurrent 
belief. But twin- oscar’s occurrent belief, just 
as oscar’s did, also involves some auditory 
imagery—that is, twin- oscar will “hear” his 
inner voice asserting the claim and will assent 
to it. since twin- english differs from english 
in the way mentioned above, twin- oscar’s in-
ner voice will have the phenomenal character 
of him saying to himself: “the background 
color of the flag of nepal is crimson.” if the 
way i’ve described the phenomenal character 
of twin- oscar’s belief is correct, (Pi) is false.
 Let’s recapitulate what i’ve said so far. 
First, i argued that the only intrinsic dif-
ference in phenomenal character between 
oscar’s first and second occurrent beliefs is 
his auditory imagery, the auditory imagery of 
“hearing” his inner voice assert the two eng-
lish sentences that express the two distinct 
propositions in question. so this difference in 
auditory imagery must be the difference that 
maps onto the difference in the content of os-
car’s intentional state, if (Pi) is true. Let’s call 
the full phenomenal character- type of oscar’s 
occurrent belief that the background color 
of the flag of Nepal is crimson phenomenal 
character- type P. Returning to twin- oscar, 
let’s call the full phenomenal character- type 
of his belief that the background color of the 
flag of Nepal is red phenomenal character- 
type C. the intentional content associated 
with oscar’s P and twin- oscar’s C differs. 
Phenomenal Intentionality entails, then, 
that P and C will be distinct phenomenal 
character- types. But P = C. so (Pi) is false. 
P and C contain identical visual imagery, 
identical attentive focus on a particular aspect 
of the visual imagery (the background color 
of the image in the “mind’s eye”), identical 
phenomenology of belief (as opposed to 
desire, hope, etc.). the only potential differ-
ence is in their auditory imagery. But since 
twin- oscar speaks twin- english, his inner 
voice will be saying what is phonetically and 
lexically identical to “the background color 
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of the flag of nepal is crimson” in english. 
oscar speaks english, so his inner voice will 
be saying what is phonetically and lexically 
identical to “the background of the flag of 
nepal is crimson.” P and C contain the same 
auditory imagery, along with the rest of their 
full phenomenal character. therefore, P = C.
iii. some complications
 the details of describing phenomenal 
character are notoriously tricky. i’ve done 
the best i can to describe the occurrent phe-
nomenology that i have when i reflect on my 
beliefs that the background color of the flag of 
Nepal is red and the background color of the 
flag of Nepal is crimson, respectively. others 
may reflectively seem to be in states with a 
different phenomenal character when they 
concentrate on these contents. For example, 
some might believe that they can introspec-
tively phenomenally discriminate between 
the applications of any two concepts, such 
as crimson and red. or perhaps, for some, 
focusing on the determinable red of the flag is 
phenomenally different from focusing on the 
determinate crimson.6 horgan and tienson 
(2002), for example, claim that
the intentionality that we are talking about—
even when it is specifically tied to certain 
words in english or some other natural lan-
guage—does not attach to those words simply 
as sequences or patterns of sounds, or even as 
syntactic structures. it attaches to awareness of 
those words qua contentful . . . even if thinking 
did always involve auditory imagery, the audi-
tory imagery would be intentionally loaded in 
the experience, not intentionally empty.7
 this passage has a weaker reading and a 
stronger reading. on the weaker reading, 
horgan and tienson are pointing out that 
having the auditory imagery of “the back-
ground of the flag of nepal is crimson” will 
always be coupled with some other phenom-
enology in order to imbue the phenomenal 
character of the state its intentional content. 
on this weak reading, the phenomenally felt 
connection between the auditory imagery and 
the visual imagery in oscar and twin- oscar’s 
phenomenal states is enough to generate in-
tentional content, and the counter- example 
goes through (setting aside other potential 
objections).
 on the stronger reading, horgan and tien-
son are claiming that there must be some 
further non- auditory, non- visual conceptual 
phenomenology that imbues oscar and twin- 
oscar’s auditory and visual imagery with 
meaning and thus intentional content. And 
the further phenomenal character is enough 
to render P and C distinct, contrary to what 
i’ve claimed above. in response, i want to be 
clear that i am not denying that there may 
be people who have the relevant conceptual 
phenomenology, over and above auditory and 
visual imagery, to intrinsically distinguish 
states such as P and C, even when all audi-
tory and visual imagery is held fixed. But 
this possibility is compatible with the argu-
ment of the paper. since (Pi) is a necessity 
claim, even if the case as described is only 
successful in people with phenomenal pro-
files similar to mine, that would be counter- 
example enough to show that (Pi) is false.8
the proponent of (Pi) could also conceivably 
argue that i and others are just mistaken 
about the phenomenal character we are ex-
periencing when we reflect on the contents 
of our beliefs about the flag of nepal. this 
is certainly possible—neither the proponent 
nor the opponent of (Pi) need be committed 
to the infallibility of introspection. But if the 
proponent of (Pi) is to defend this approach, 
she must provide some reason independent 
of (Pi) to think that our introspection is fail-
ing in this case. And it is hard to see what 
reason could be given. Furthermore, the 
proponent of (Pi) faces some pressure to hold 
on to the general reliability of introspection 
since defenses of (Pi) characteristically rely 
on introspecting on the phenomenology of 
thought.9 As Kriegel says, “central in mo-
tivating sympathizers [to PiRP] is the idea 
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that phenomenal intentionality is simply 
introspectively manifest.”10
A second concern about the argument given 
above is that its success relies on illicitly 
smuggling in a difference in externalistically 
determined content and then treating this dif-
ference as one of narrow content. since (Pi) is 
only a claim about narrow content, showing 
that oscar and twin- oscar can have states 
with identical phenomenal character with a 
different externalistically determined content 
can be happily welcomed by its defenders.
 in order to see if this objection works, we 
have to get clear about both oscar and twin- 
oscar’s respective narrow belief contents. 
the contents of their beliefs about the flag 
of nepal are partially externalistically de-
termined, since at the very least, what object 
counts as the flag of Nepal will depend on a 
believer’s local environment. More contro-
versially, what properties are picked out by 
color concepts such as red and crimson may 
also be partially determined by a believer’s 
local environment. if both the object and 
the property that make up the proposition 
believed are partially externalistically deter-
mined, what content remains to be identified 
as narrow? one helpful in- depth discussion 
of the proponent of (Pi)’s conception of 
narrow content can be found in horgan, 
tienson, and Graham (2004). According to 
horgan, tienson, and Graham (2004), narrow 
contents (determined by phenomenal charac-
ter alone) are “thoughts that are expressible 
linguistically using only (i) logical vocabu-
lary, (ii) predicates expressing properties 
and relations to which the experiencer can 
mentally refer in a phenomenally constituted 
way, and (iii) certain first- person indexical 
expressions.”11
 one important question that immediately 
arises is how extensive of a category (ii) 
is—that is, how many predicates express 
properties that can be referred to by a subject 
in a completely “phenomenally constituted,” 
and thus narrow, way? horgan, tienson, and 
Graham say:
[W]e take it that the range of such properties 
and relations is very extensive. it appears to 
include, inter alia, temporal relations, causal 
relations, properties like being a temporally 
persisting object, being an animal, being an 
agent, and being a person, numerous artifactual 
kinds like being a container and being a table, 
and numerous social relations and properties 
like being friend of, being a boss of, and being 
a politician.12
 if horgan, tienson, and Graham (2004) are 
right, color concepts are almost certainly nar-
rowly constituted. so this gives us some idea 
of oscar and twin- oscar’s narrow contents 
and how they contribute to determining the 




narrow content  
(Phenomenally constituted)
Wide content  
(Determined by narrow content  
+ external environment)
oscar Visual imagery of the flag of 
nepal, attentive focus on the back-
ground color, auditory imagery that 
sounds like “the background color 
of the flag of nepal is crimson.”
there is an x and there is a 
y such that x is a flag, y is a 
country, y is named “nepal”, x 
is the flag of y, and crimson is 
the background color of x.
the background color of the flag 
of nepal is crimson.
twin-oscar Visual imagery of the flag of 
nepal, attentive focus on the back-
ground color, auditory imagery that 
sounds like “the background color 
of the flag of nepal is crimson.”
there is an x and there is a 
y such that x is a flag, y is a 
country, y is named “nepal”, 
x is the flag of y, and red is the 
background color of x.
the background color of the flag 
of nepal is red.
APQ 52_3 text.indd   265 5/20/15   2:57 PM
266  / AMeRicAn PhiLosoPhicAL QuARteRLy
 i’ve modeled oscar and twin- oscar’s 
narrow contents on horgan, tienson, and 
Graham’s analysis of the narrow content of 
the belief that “[a] picture is hanging crooked 
on a wall directly in front of me.”13 notice 
again that oscar and twin- oscar’s beliefs 
have the same phenomenal character, as 
i’ve argued above. Why, then, do their nar-
row contents come apart in table 1? What 
i’ve been supposing is that phenomenology 
discriminates oscar and twin- oscars’ color 
concepts in (at most) two ways. First, their 
phenomenology focuses in on a particular 
color in their visual imagery—as they do 
when focusing on the background color of the 
flag of nepal. second, their phenomenology 
discriminates concepts via what we might 
call a “phenomenal name.” And as it turns 
out, oscar’s phenomenal name for crimson is 
(an auditory imaging of) “crimson,” whereas 
twin- oscar’s phenomenal name for red is 
also (an auditory imaging of) “crimson.” 
so the phenomenal names oscar and twin- 
oscar have are phenomenologically identical, 
despite their referring to different concepts. 
normally, this would not be a problem since 
some other aspect of their respective phe-
nomenal characters will be different—the 
attentive focus, the object of the focus, or 
the phenomenology of proposition attitude 
(belief, desire, wish, etc.). But in the case 
above, oscar and twin- oscar are focused 
on the same visual image, attending to the 
same aspect of that image, and in fact also 
attending to the very same token property of 
that image. since crimson is the determinate 
of the determinable red, the color of the 
visual images of oscar and twin- oscar will 
also be identical. in short, if everything i’ve 
said is correct, oscar and twin- oscar are in 
states with identical phenomenal character. 
But since the (narrowly conceived) concept 
oscar picks out with the phenomenal name 
“crimson” is different from the (narrowly 
conceived) concept twin- oscar picks out 
with the phenomenal name “crimson,” their 
narrow contents will differ in what properties 
they are ascribing to the (narrowly conceived) 
flag.
 Perhaps the horgan, tienson, and Gra-
ham (2004) conception of phenomenally 
determined narrow content is too broad. 
it’s certainly consistent with (Pi) to have 
a thinner set of phenomenally determined 
predicates. however, there is some pressure 
on the proponent of (Pi) to have a sufficiently 
thick conception of narrow content in order to 
render (Pi) an interesting claim. But let’s set 
that aside and consider what i take to be the 
thinnest possible way to construe the narrow 
contents of two beliefs that oscar and twin- 
oscar might have while looking at a crimson 
(and therefore also red) wall of paint directly 
in front of them. (i use a simplified example 
to avoid unnecessary complications with how 
to construe thinly the narrow content of “the 
flag of nepal” and “background color”)
oscar’s belief that 
that thing is crimson. 
there is an x and 
there is a y such that 
x is a thing and y is 
a color- property and 
y is called “crimson” 
and x has y.
twin- oscar’s belief 
that that thing is red. 
there is an x and 
there is a y such that 
x is a thing and y is a 
color- property and y 
is called “crimson” 
and x has y.
 if we construe narrow content this thinly, 
oscar and twin- oscar do share the same 
narrow content with their respective beliefs. 
their beliefs differ in wide content only be-
cause of facts about their respective linguistic 
communities. so construing narrow content 
so that color concepts are externalistically 
determined will resolve the problem for the 
proponent of (Pi) in this case.
 there is a serious concern about this fix, 
however. if proponents of (Pi) are to fully 
avoid the problem that the red/crimson case 
brings out, this thinning of the narrow con-
tent fix must adequately generalize. But it is 
hard to see how they can claim that the fix 
generalizes without giving up any non- trivial 
APQ 52_3 text.indd   266 5/20/15   2:57 PM
chARActeR (ALone) Doesn’t count / 267
conception of narrow content. to see why this 
is, notice that the red/crimson case does not 
rely on any special facts about color concepts 
or color properties. instead, the case works, 
if it works at all, only as a result of the de-
terminable/determinate relation between red 
and crimson. so if proponents of (Pi) are to 
generalize this fix to all cases of this sort, they 
are committed to the view that no concepts 
that bear the determinable/determinate rela-
tion to each other are phenomenally consti-
tuted. this would rule out paradigmatically 
phenomenally constituted concepts such as 
triangle/isosceles- triangle, painful/achy, 
and even being- a- logical- operator/being- a- 
disjunction- operator. i think it is unlikely that 
most proponents of (Pi) would want to bite 
this bullet.
 it’s worth emphasizing one other reason 
why defenders of (Pi) ought to focus on 
finding a difference in phenomenal character, 
rather than one in externalistically deter-
mined content. one important motivation 
behind the PiRP is to provide a defense of the 
thought that narrow content plays a crucial 
role in determining wide content. Almost 
all proponents of the PiRP agree that the 
world has a role to play in determining wide 
content, but this is only when combined with 
phenomenally constituted narrow content.14 
As a result, assuming oscar and twin- oscar 
are in the same otherwise (non- linguistically) 
identical environment, the only thing left to 
explain how oscar and twin- oscar’s belief 
states have different wide content is by an ap-
peal to a difference in narrow content. Given 
that proponents of the PiRP are looking for 
a non- trivial conception of phenomenally 
constituted narrow content, there is strong 
theoretical pressure for them to agree with 
the middle column of the first table above. 
the challenge for them would then be to 
explain why i am mistaken about the first 
column, that oscar and twin- oscar are in 
states with the same intrinsic phenomenal 
character.
 Finally, it might be thought that there is 
some kind of sleight of hand in the argument 
given above. For one thing, i could be accused 
of misrepresenting oscar and twin- oscar as 
twins. horgan and tienson make use, in their 
arguments for (Pc), of the idea of phenom-
enal duplicates. two people are phenomenal 
duplicates “just in case each creature’s total 
experience, throughout its existence, is phe-
nomenally exactly similar to the other’s.”15
if oscar and twin- oscar are both competent 
users of the concepts of red and crimson, 
then they can’t be phenomenal duplicates in 
this sense. oscar and twin- oscar must have 
different phenomenological histories, if they 
were to have properly learned the concepts 
and their english/twin- english words for 
expressing those concepts. When oscar was a 
child, he was shown a wide variety of shades 
of red and was told; “these are red.” this 
allowed him to connect his concept of red 
to the english word “red.” twin- oscar had 
a similar experience, except when he was 
shown the wide variety of shades of red, he 
was told: “these are crimson.” this allowed 
him to connect his concept of red to the twin- 
english word “crimson.”
 this conclusively shows that oscar and 
twin- oscar are not phenomenological du-
plicates, since part of what makes someone 
a person’s phenomenological duplicate is 
sharing a complete phenomenological his-
tory. Furthermore, they differ with respect to 
what things they label “red” and “crimson” 
(though not in what they believe are red and 
crimson—they have all the same beliefs about 
the colors of objects; they just speak different 
languages). so oscar and twin- oscar not 
only fail to share their phenomenological 
histories, but they are also disposed to have 
differences in phenomenal character. say 
we showed them both the flag of canada 
and asked them to form an occurrent belief 
about the color of the Maple Leaf on the 
flag. the phenomenal character of oscar 
and twin- oscar’s beliefs would be different. 
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twin- oscar’s inner voice would say: “the 
color of the Maple Leaf is crimson,” and os-
car’s inner voice would say: “the color of the 
Maple Leaf is red.” so oscar and twin- oscar 
not only fail to be phenomenal duplicates in 
virtue of their histories, but they also fail to 
be phenomenal duplicates in virtue of their 
dispositions for having future phenomenal 
states.
 i concede everything just said. oscar and 
twin- oscar are not phenomenal duplicates. 
they don’t share the same phenomenological 
history, and their phenomenology is likely to 
come apart again in the future. the difficulty 
is in leveraging this into an objection to the 
argument given above. this is because (Pc) 
and (Pi) are usually taken to be claims about 
intrinsic phenomenal character, not about 
a relation between phenomenal states over 
some extended period of time. in Kriegel’s 
expository article concerning the PiRP, he 
notes that one widely held thesis amongst 
defenders of the PiRP is;
(in) Intrinsic Subjectivity: necessarily, for any 
intentional state M, if M is non- derivatively 
subjective [where non- derivatively subjective 
means that it is a state that represents com-
pletely intrinsically], then M is phenomenally 
intentional.16
 intrinsic subjectivity says that, at least 
with respect to the narrow intentional content 
constitutively determined by phenomenal 
character (in their phrase, phenomenal inten-
tionality), the intentional state is fully deter-
mined by its intrinsic phenomenal character 
alone. the motivation for accepting (in) is 
one that should appeal to all proponents of the 
PiRP. this is because an important task of the 
PiRP is in explaining how non- phenomenal 
states can have intentional content only de-
rivatively from phenomenal states.17 Appeal-
ing to differences in phenomenal histories 
or dispositions for phenomenal differences 
in the future is beside the point, and cannot 
show that two different agents have distinct 
phenomenal characters at a particular time. 
either phenomenal histories are relevant to 
assessing the intentional content determined 
by a phenomenal state, or they are not. Re-
gardless, (Pi) is in trouble. if phenomenal 
histories are relevant, then both (in) and 
(Pi) are false, since they are claims about 
present phenomenal character. if phenomenal 
histories are not relevant, then my argument 
against (Pi) goes through.
 it’s worth emphasizing that this appeal to 
phenomenal histories and/or dispositions 
for phenomenal differences in the future is 
in tension with (in), (Pi), and (Pc) because 
it seems to be a mistake that advocates such 
as horgan and tienson make. We saw above 
their definition of what counts as someone’s 
phenomenal duplicate—they must share an 
entire phenomenological history. But then 
they claim that, using the notion of a phe-
nomenal duplicate, (Pc) can be restated as 
the Phenomenal Duplicate Thesis:
Phenomenal Duplicate Thesis (PD): there is a 
kind of intentional content, pervasive in human 
life, such that any two possible phenomenal 
duplicates have exactly similar intentional states 
vis- à- vis such content.18
 in fact, some of horgan and tienson’s argu-
ments in favor of (Pc) presuppose that (PD) is 
nothing more than a restatement of (Pc). We 
can now see that this is mistaken. Phenomenal 
constitution claims that a particular phenom-
enal character alone constitutively determines 
some particular intentional state. Phenomenal 
Duplicate thesis only claims that agents with 
entirely identical phenomenological histories 
will be in the same intentional state insofar as 
they are in states with identical phenomenal 
character. so (PD) is consistent with, while 
(Pc) is not, historical factors affecting the in-
tentional content of a particular mental state. 
Furthermore, (Pi), the thesis that proponents 
use to leverage arguments for their research 
program, if true, would support (Pc) but not 
(PD). And only a full- fledged commitment 
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to (Pc) will save (in), one of the PiRP’s 
fundamental tenets. so, although (PD) is an 
interesting claim that is related to (Pc), (Pc) 
is the thesis that must be true if the PiRP is to 
be salvageable. And (Pc) entails (Pi), which 
i have argued is false.
conclusion
 in sum, i think my argument against (Pi) is 
successful: two agents can be in states with 
identical phenomenal characters, while hav-
ing distinct intentional contents. since (Pc) 
entails (Pi), if my argument is successful, 
then (Pc) must also be false. this threatens 
to shake the foundations of the PiRP, since 
(Pc) is arguably the single most central 
claim of the program. Proponents of (Pc) 
have, rightfully i think, pointed out that 
paradigmatically intentional states have their 
own associated phenomenology. this fact 
had been widely overlooked by analytic phi-
losophers of mind, and so it is an important 
point in itself. the mistake that proponents 
of (Pc) make is in assuming that this asso-
ciated phenomenology provides powerful 
evidence that there is some constitutive or 
necessary connection between the two kinds 
of mental states. Phenomenal character alone 




i would like to especially thank esa Diaz- Leon and three anonymous referees for detailed comments 
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1. this is Kriegel’s (2013) phrase.
2. see Kriegel (2013, p. 5); horgan and tienson (2002, p. 520); and Graham, horgan, and tienson 
(2007, p. 471).
3. i thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this formulation of (Pi).
4. For example, empirical research has shown that people’s capacities for forming visual imagery vary 
greatly. some lack visual imagery completely. others, especially those with severe cases of dyslexia, 
are lacking an “inner voice.” see, for example, Brewer and schommer- Aikins (2006); Marks (1973, 
1995); cui et al. (2007); Baddeley et al. (1982); swam and Goswami (1997); and Bruck (1992).
5. if the reader has any lingering methodological worries, i can only briefly note that my arguments 
are of the same structure and form that proponents of the PiRP generally give to defend both (Pi) and 
(Pc). (see, e.g., horgan and tienson 2002, sections 2–4).
6. i thank esa Diaz- Leon and two anonymous referees for pressing me on these points.
7. horgan and tienson (2002, p. 523).
8. i’ve asked several people to reflect on their phenomenological states when considering beliefs with 
these contents. it’s been about evenly divided between people who describe it similar to the way i do 
above and people who describe it differently in some important way (e.g., no inner voice).
9. see, for example, horgan and tienson (2002, pp. 521–524); Kriegel (2013, section ii); siewert 
(1998, chap. 1, and throughout).
10. Kriegel (2013, p. 7); emphasis in original.
11. horgan, tienson, and Graham (2004, p. 306).
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12. ibid, p. 305.
13. ibid., p. 306.
14. Farkas (2008) is an exception to this general rule. nothing in my argument relies on the widely 
accepted claim noted in the text, so i take it that the argument applies equally well to Farkas’s view.
15. horgan and tienson (2002, p. 524). horgan, Graham, and tienson (2004) also make extensive use 
of the idea of phenomenal duplicates.
16. Kriegel (2013, p. 11).
17. see Kriegel (2013), especially the discussion of the Basicness thesis.
18. horgan and tienson (2002, p. 524).
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